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This study shows that cause and types of errors in complex 
problem-solving tasks can be explained within a framework 
of the prevalence effect commonly studied only in simple 
visual search tasks. The explanation proposes that subjects 
make a series of probabilistic decisions aimed at balancing 
both speed and accuracy. Such decision is a complex process 
that relies not only on task instructions but also on cognitive 
biases established by the history of previous trials and 
progress of the current trial. We provide evidence based on 
both empirical data and cognitive modeling. 
Keywords: problem-solving, cause of errors, prevalence, 
ACT-R 
Introduction 
Why and how do people make mistakes in complex 
problem-solving tasks? What are the primary cognitive 
mechanisms? We try to answer these questions using a 
computerized version of a board game SET
1
. Compared to 
typical laboratory tasks, SET is a more complex task 
requiring implicit and explicit strategies, coordination of 
bottom-up perceptual and top-down executive processes, 
making consecutive decisions and accumulation of evidence 
along several dimensions. Any of these components can be 
a source of errors. Despite a number of preceding studies 
focused on SET (Jacob & Hochstein, 2008; Mackey, Hill, 
Stone, & Bunge, 2011; Nyamsuren & Taatgen, 2013), none 
of them looked at the source of errors. However, the nature 
of errors can tell us a lot more about the process of problem 
solving than just the response times and accuracies. We 
employ a combination of empirical study based on Math 
Garden and cognitive modeling to tackle this problem. Math 
Garden (Klinkenberg, Straatemeier, & Van der Maas, 2011) 
is a web-based computer adaptive practice and monitoring 
system used by more than 2000 schools to train students' 
cognitive skills with serious games such as SET. 
A SET trial starts with a number of cards dealt open 
(Figure 1). Each card is uniquely defined by a combination 
of four attributes: color, shape, shading and the number of 
shapes. Each attribute can have one of three distinct values. 
The goal is to find a unique combination of three cards, 
called a set, where values of each attribute are all same or all 
different. We refer to the number of different attributes in a 
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 SET is a game by Set Enterprises (http://www.setgame.com) 
set as the set level. For example, in Figure 1, a level 2 set is 
formed by three yellow cards. It has two same (color and 
shape) and two different (shading and number) attributes. In 
a level 4 set, all values of all attributes are different. 
Jacob and Hochstein (2008) proposed that SET players 
use a dimension reduction strategy.  They prefer to search 
for a set among cards that have the same attribute value thus 
effectively reducing the search space by one attribute 
dimension. For example, a subject may look for a set among 
cards of the same color. A later study (Nyamsuren, & 
Taatgen, 2013) confirmed Jacob and Hochstein's theory. 
Nyamsuren and Taatgen also found that dimension 
reduction is mostly used early in a trial. If dimension 
reduction strategy fails to find a set, subjects start searching 




Figure 1: An example of a trial used in Math Garden. A 
level 2 set is formed by the yellow cards. 
Experimental Results 
The data was gathered in Math Garden between April 2014 
and October 2014. It included 1374530 trials of 80 items 
(20 items per set level) played by 86964 subjects. Each item 
consisted of six cards and had exactly one set (e.g. Figure 
1). A trial was terminated after a subject selected any 
combination of three cards. There was 30-seconds time limit 
per trial. Above sample does not include overtime trials or 
trials without proper responses (a subject can give up on a 
trial and request to shown an answer). 
Accuracy and Response Time 
The average accuracy
2
 is around 70%. In 30% of the trials, 
subjects responded with wrong combinations of three cards 
(further referred as triplets). First, we study cause of errors 
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 Math Garden dynamically adjusts difficulty to maintain a 75% 
success rate. Therefore, relative accuracy is uninformative. 
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by analyzing response times (RT). 
Confirmed by a linear regression carried out on trials' 
mean RT, Figure 2a shows that response times increase with 
set level for both correct and incorrect trials (β = 2.05, 
t(156) = 20.2, p < .01). In correct trials, the increase is 
caused by two factors (Nyamsuren & Taatgen, 2013). 
Firstly, subjects tend to start a trial with search for a lower-
level set and, if the set was not found, switch to search for 
higher-level sets. Secondly, it requires more effort to 
compare dissimilar attributes than similar attributes. It is 
likely that the same two factors are also responsible for RT 
increase in incorrect trials. Mean RT for correct trials is 
lower than mean RT for incorrect trials (β = -1.17, t(156) = -
4.2, p < .01). However, this difference in RT decreases as 
the set level increases (β = .35, t(156) = 3.5, p < .01). Note 
that, for items with level 4 sets, mean RT for incorrect trials 




Figure 2: (a) Response times for correct and incorrect trials 
averaged by set level; Distributions of proportions of triplets 
by the number of valid attributes calculated from (b) all 
possible combinations of triplets in 80 items and (c) triplets 
provided as response by subjects. 
Errors Based on Types of Triplets 
Previous studies showed that perceptual aspects of SET 
have significant influence on subjects' decisions (e.g. 
Nyamsuren & Taatgen, 2013). Similarly, error types in SET 
may be affected by perceptual components of the task. In 
this section, we explore whether properties of a triplet 
defined by its combinations of attribute values affect 
subjects' decisions and error patterns. 
Subsequent analyses concern incorrect trials where 
subjects responded with wrong triplets. Figure 2b shows a 
distribution of proportions of triplets by the number of valid 
attributes in a triplet. An attribute is valid if it follows the 
set rule and thus is either the same or different in all cards of 
the triplet. These proportions are calculated from all 
possible non-repeating combinations of triplets in all 80 
items. They serve as a baseline. Figure 2c shows the same 
distribution, but with proportions calculated from wrong 
triplets provided as responses. According to Figure 2c, 
triplets with 2 or 3 valid attributes have significantly above 
chance probability of being chosen as a set. In other words, 
errors made by subjects are systematic and not random. 
More set-like triplets with higher number of valid attributes 
have higher probability of being incorrectly chosen as a set. 
More importantly, there is a negative correlation between 
the number of valid attributes and RT. Errors with triplets 
with more valid attributes are made sooner than errors with 
triplets with fewer valid attributes. According to a linear 
regression analysis, RT decreases by 188 ms with each valid 
attribute in a triplet (t(1518) = -2.26, p = .024). 
Errors Based on Sameness and Difference 
The previous section showed that the number of valid 
attributes in a triplet could have a significant impact on 
subjects' decisions. However, a valid attribute can be either 
same or different among three cards of the triplet. We found 
that sameness or difference of an attribute plays a 




Figure 3: Distributions of proportions of errors types in 
trials categorized by set level. A wrong triplet consisting of 
three cards on the left of Figure 1 would give a 1-1 error 
type, since this answer contains one valid same attribute 
(shading) and one valid different attribute (color). 
 
The following analysis concerns incorrect trials where 
subjects responded with wrong triplets. Figure 3 shows 
distributions of proportions of triplets with specific 
combinations of same and different valid attributes. The 
proportions were calculated separately for groups of trials of 
the same set levels. In trials with level 1 sets, most errors are 
made with triplets that had same valid attributes. For 
example, about 35% of all errors in level 1 trials involved 
triplets with two valid same attributes and no valid different 
attributes. The effect is completely opposite in trials with 
level 4 sets. In those trials, the most frequent errors involve 
triplets with different valid attributes. In fact, the gradual 
shift from sameness to difference can be observed in the 
distributions of proportions as set level increases. For levels 
1 to 4, mean numbers of same attributes in wrong triplets 
are 1.4, 0.93, 0.61 and 0.46 against expected 0.67, 0.41, 
0.33 and 0.21 if triplets were chosen randomly. Similar 
above chance preference was observed for different 
attributes in higher-level sets. Therefore, this shift likely 
represents a systematic shift in criterion against which 
subjects evaluate validity of attribute combinations. 
Cause of Errors 
An explanation of errors in SET can be derived from the 




tasks where a target can be either present or absent. In low-
prevalence conditions, subjects miss the target more often 
than in high-prevalence conditions (Wolfe, Horowitz, Van 
Wert, Kenner, Place, & Kibbi, 2007). Subjects do not 
explicitly try to speed up their responses using some time 
threshold. Instead, they adjust their internally estimated 
probability of a target being absent based on the sequence of 
previous trials (Ishibashi, Kita & Wolfe, 2012). This 
probability affects the decision on whether an object is a 
target or a distractor and the decision to quit the trial. 
Within-trial Prevalence 
With a proposal of within-trial prevalence, we assume that 
subject's internally estimated probability of finding a set 
changes during the progression of a trial. Subjects are aware 
that there is always one set present in each trial. Therefore, 
although probability of finding a set at the start of a trial is 
very low, it increases as a subject continues search and 
discards more distractor triplets. Wolfe and Van Wert 
(2010) proposed that the prevalence effect can be modeled 
via a drift diffusion model where decision is made when an 
evidence accumulation reaches a certain threshold. 
Similarly, we propose that subjects pick a triplet as a set 
when the accumulating probability reaches some threshold. 
During the trial, each discarded triplet increases probability 




Figure 4: An evidence accumulation account of a within-
trial prevalence in SET. 
 
We know that the more set-like triplets are, the more 
likely they are to be chosen as a set. The effect can be 
explained with an assumption that an increasing similarity 
of a triplet to a set results in a temporary increase in within-
trial probability. This process can be viewed as a large but 
temporary step-wise increase in accumulation caused by 
each new validated attribute (blue lines in Figure 4). Higher 
number of valid attributes will result in a larger increase in 
accumulation and a higher probability of exceeding the 
acceptance threshold. However, an attribute with invalid 
combination may negate the local boost in probability and 
results in the triplet being discarded as a potential set. 
Even when a set is found early, the temporary increase in 
probability caused by four valid attributes is normally 
sufficient to exceed the threshold. On the other hand, in late 
trials, wrong triplets with few valid attributes will have a 
higher chance of exceeding the threshold due to constantly 
increasing probability. This process will result in incorrect 
trials having higher RT than correct trials (Figure 2a).  
Finally, triplets with higher number of valid attributes 
may exceed the threshold sooner than triplets with fewer 
valid attributes explaining the negative correlation between 
RT and the number of valid attributes observed in the data. 
Between-trial Prevalence 
The prevalence effect also provides a framework for 
explaining why subjects shift from sameness to difference 
when validating attribute combinations. Here, changing 
prevalence of trials with particular set levels is a likely 
cause for such criterion shift. The adaptive algorithm in 
Math Garden ensures that next trial's difficulty is tailored to 
subject's skills. Therefore, new subjects start with easy trials 
with level 1 sets and are gradually introduced to more 
difficult trials. As a result, trials with level 1 and 4 sets 
initially have high and low prevalence respectively. 
However, as subjects gain more experience, prevalence of 
trials with level 1 and level 4 sets decreases and increases 
respectively causing subjects to shift their set acceptance 
criterion from similarity to dissimilarity. Based on data of 
432 subjects who played at least 100 trials, proportions of 
trials with set levels 1 and 4 in first 25 trials are 63% and 
7% respectively. For the fourth bin of 25 trials, the same 
proportions change to 18% and 28% respectively. 
In terms of evidence accumulation account shown in 
Figure 4, different and same valid attributes make different 
contributions to the temporary increases in accumulation. In 
trials with level 1 sets, valid different attributes may not 
cause temporary increase in accumulation or may even have 
inhibitory effect on accumulation. However, as a subject is 
exposed more to trials with higher set levels, contributions 
of valid different attribute may gradually increase. 
Threshold 
The fact that the RT increases with set level indicates that 
the threshold is not the same among trials with different set 
levels. It is likely that subjects dynamically adjust their 
threshold whenever it is too low or too high, as in other 
visual search tasks. Chun and Wolfe (1996) showed that 
subjects' RT in target absent-present visual search tasks can 
be reproduced with a model using a dynamic threshold 
adjusted in a staircase manner. It was further suggested that 
RT in low- and high-prevalence search tasks can be 
modeled via adjustment of a quitting threshold (Wolfe & 
Van Wert, 2010). In a more recent visual foraging study, 
subjects adjusted in a staircase manner their probability of 
remaining on a patch depending on whether an instance of 
foraging was successful or not (Wolfe, 2013).  
We draw an analogy from above examples and propose 
that subjects in SET are also adjusting set acceptance 
threshold in a staircase manner based on the result of the 
previous trial. After making a mistake, a subject may 
become more conservative and increase set acceptance 
threshold. The opposite will happen after a correct trial 




A cognitive model was used to formally test validity of the 
processes proposed in the preceding section. We have 
reused a model of a SET player developed in our earlier 
work. Due to space limit, we will describe only essential 
details of the model. The reader is referred to previous 
literature for a detailed description of the model 
(Nyamsuren & Taatgen, 2013). The model is based on 
ACT-R cognitive architecture (Anderson, 2007) that 
simulates functionality of essential cognitive resources such 
as declarative memory, working memory, the visual system 
and the production system. Within a model, task-related 
instructions are implemented as a set of production rules. 
The overall strategy used by the model is simple. The 
model chooses a triplet and compares validity of four 
attributes one by one in a random order. This is done by 
having a production rule named 'compare' repeatedly being 
called for each attribute. Only when all four attributes form 
valid combinations, the model chooses the triplet as a set 
ending a trial. When any attribute yields an invalid 
combination, the triplet is discarded and a new triplet is 
chosen. At the beginning of the trial, the model prefers 
triplets of cards having, at least, one common value (e.g. all 
green cards). Later in the trial, the model switches to triplets 
with cards that are more dissimilar. 
The original model did not make mistakes. We have 
extended the model by implementing error-making 
mechanisms described in the preceding section. The next 
section describes those extensions. 
Production Competition as a Cause of Errors 
The original model took a conservative approach to set 
acceptance ensuring that all four attributes were valid in a 
triplet. The modified model adopts a more liberal approach 
and can accept a triplet as a set without validating all 
attributes. This is done by introducing a new production rule 
named 'valid-set' that competes with the production rule 
'compare'. This process is shown in Figure 5. Given a 
triplet, the model can either validate an attribute in the 
triplet by calling 'compare' production or accept the triplet 
as a set by calling 'valid-set' production. A production rule 
with the highest utility value U is chosen. 
Utility of 'valid-set',     , represents the accumulation 
shown in Figure 4 and indicates a probability of a triplet 
being a set.      is zero at a start of a trial but increases as 
the trial progresses according to               .    is 
the total number of unique triplets formed by six cards and 
equal to 20.    is the number of compared triplets, and 
          is the number of remaining uncompared triplets. 
     can temporary increase based on the number of 
validated attributes in a triplet. Given k validated attributes, 
probability of a set is                      , where 
     is a proportion of triplets that have k or more valid 
attributes. For each newly compared triplet, k is set to 0 but 
increases with each validated attribute in the triplet. It is 
unlikely that subjects can estimate      within each trial. 
However, it is probable that subject may able to learn 
prevalence of triplets with different values of k over many 
trials. Calculated from all unique triplets from all items, the 
proportions are        ,        ,         , and 
               since there is only one set. Therefore, 
     increases with increasing k and is equal to 1 for k = 4 
simulating the temporary increase in accumulation shown in 
Figure 4. Above proportions decrease as    increases. 
       
                        
                          
                      
         (Eq. 1) 
The utility of 'compare' production,     , represents a 
threshold for set acceptance. The threshold for i-th trial is 
calculated as                 , where     is the 
minimum number of triplets to be compared in the trial. 
     remains the same during a trial, but    decreases or 
increases between trials according to the Eq. 1. For the next 
trial,      increases if the model makes a mistake by 
responding with a wrong triplet. If set is found,      
decreases. If utility is too high and the model cannot find a 
set within a time limit then    is reset to 12, the minimum 
allowed value. This minimum value is set based on the 
assumption that subjects always have to perform some 





Figure 5: The competition between 'valid-set' and 'compare' 
productions is a cause of errors in the model. 
Bias to similarity 
Bias to similarity can occur at least at two decision points. 
First, bias can affect a choice of strategy. To replicate the 
effect of prevalence of trials with different set levels, the 
model was modified to be highly biased to the dimension 
reduction strategy while playing items with set level 1. 
However, this bias decreases with increasing set level 
following the decrease in observed proportions of trials with 
set level 1. Therefore, while playing items with set level 4, 
the model is more likely to use dissimilarity-based strategy. 
Second, similarity bias can affect a decision whether a 
triplet is a set with subjects giving an initially higher weight 
to valid same attributes than to different attributes. This bias 
is simulated using two weights    and    that affect 
calculation of the value k:            . ks and kd are 
numbers of validated same and different attribute 
respectively. If the model is using the dimension reduction 
strategy then    and    are equal to 0.5 and -0.5 
respectively. Otherwise,   and   are equal to -0.5 and 0.5 
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if the model is using a dissimilarity-based strategy. 
Those changing weights represent shift in criterion for 
accepting a triplet as a set. More specifically, weights 
coupled with decreasing bias to the dimension reduction 
strategy simulate in the model a shift in set acceptance 
criterion from similarity to dissimilarity. 
Simulation Results 
80 items were divided into 10 blocks. Each block contained 
items of the same set level and same distance between set 
cards. The model was tested on 10000 trials in each block. 
The 'compare' production had the minimum utility at the 





Figure 6: (a) Model's response time for correct and wrong 
trials of different set levels. (b) Model's accuracy by set 
level. (c) Proportions by the number of valid attributes of 




Figure 7: Distributions of proportions of errors made by the 
model in trials categorized by set level. 
 
Figure 6a shows RT produced by the model. Similar to 
experimental data, model's RT increased as set level 
increased (β = 1.0, t(156) = 7.5, p < .01). The main predictor 
for accuracy indicates that RT should be lower for correct 
trials (β = -.36, t(156) = -.97, p = .3) with the interaction 
term indicating that this difference should decrease as set 
level increased (β = .2, t(156) = -1.5, p = .14). However, 
both the main and interaction terms were not significant. 
The model was not able to simulate decreasing difference in 
RT between correct and incorrect trials observed in the 
empirical data (Figure 2a). Figure 6b shows model 
accuracy. The model predicts that the accuracy should 
decrease with set level. Most likely, this trend was not 
observed in subject data (Figure 2a) because Math Garden 
maintains 0.75 probability success by matching trial's 
difficulty to subject's skills. Figure 6c shows types of 
model-made errors defined by the number of valid 
attributes. Similar to subjects (Figure 2c), the model is more 
likely to make errors with triplets that have high number of 
two or three valid attributes. The increasing number of valid 
attributes also results in lower RT for incorrect trials (β = -
1.1, t(844) = -4.3, p < .01). However, the decrease of 1.1 
seconds per valid attribute is much higher than 0.188 
seconds observed in subjects' data. 
Figure 7 shows distributions of proportions of incorrectly 
selected triplets with specific combinations of same and 
different valid attributes. The model's data closely resembles 
the empirical data shown in Figure 3. Correlations between 
the proportions in the empirical data and model data are r(7) 
= .86, p < .01 for level 1, r(7) = .84, p < .01 for level 2, r(7) 
= .97, p < .01 for level 3, and r(7) = .99, p < .01 for level 4. 
The model shows the same shift in criterion from similarity 
to dissimilarity in its decision of a triplet being a set. 
Overall, model simulations support our hypothesis that the 
prevalence effect, internally estimated probability of finding 
a set, can be a cause of errors. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Speed-accuracy trade-off (Wickelgren, 1977) may also 
contribute to errors since Math Garden pressures subjects to 
finish a trial both quickly and accurately. However, it is 
unlikely to be the sole or even the main cause of errors in 
SET. First, the negative correlation between the number of 
valid attributes and RT is not easily explained by speeded 
responses. Second, a critical assumption behind the speed-
accuracy trade-off is that errors should disappear if subjects 
are discouraged from giving fast responses. However, the 
reward system used in Math Garden severely punishes for 
fast incorrect responses making it more profitable to make 
slow correct responses. Therefore, the ideal strategy is either 
to give a correct response or let the time run out. The fact 
that subjects make early errors (Figure 2a) despite 
discouragement of fast responses violates the assumption 
behind the speed-accuracy trade-off. Wolfe at al. (2007) 
also explicitly differentiated the prevalence effect from 
speed-accuracy trade-off and showed that people resort to 
probabilistic decision making even in absence of a time 
pressure. The prevalence-based explanation assumes that 
that estimated probability causes changes in both RT and 
accuracy (Wolfe & Van Wert, 2010). Therefore, 
manipulations based on time should have little effect on 
estimated probability and, therefore, on accuracy explaining 
why subjects still made early errors in SET despite strong 
discouragement in Math Garden. 
Therefore, a general question that has not been addressed 
in other studies is why a probabilistic decision is made 
despite an opportunity to verify their answers. We propose 




pursue efficiency. Efficiency is achieved by minimizing the 
amount of cognitive effort to accomplish the task while still 
maintaining a reasonably high degree of success. This 
efficiency optimization is different from the common 
definition of optimization aimed at finding the optimal 
solution. Instead, in cognitive literature, efficient strategy is 
often referred to as heuristic (Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009). 
Heuristics are simple strategies that do not guarantee 
absolute success rate but work most of the time. A necessity 
for heuristics is dictated by the framework of bounded 
rationality (Simon, 1972). It assumes that cognitive 
resources are limited and, therefore, processes utilizing the 
least amount of resources are favored even at the expense of 
accuracy. Note that a time pressure is not a required 
component for a formation or use of heuristics. 
Above discussion suggests that the prevalence effect is a 
general phenomenon beyond simple visual search tasks 
commonly used to study the effect. Our study shows that it 
may play an important role in complex problem-solving 
tasks. For example, a similar effect is commonly observed 
in causal reasoning tasks. Griffiths, Sobel, Tenenbaum and 
Gopnik (2011) showed that subjects internally estimate 
Bayesian-like probabilities to judge causal relations between 
an effect and two possible causes. Although subjects were 
aware that it is possible for both options to independently 
cause the effect, their judgments were highly correlated with 
frequencies of both options causing the effect. The more 
prevalent option was not only likely to be classified as a 
cause but also decreased the probability of positive 
classification for the second option despite the independence 
of causes. Therefore, decision-making in causal task is not 
just frequency-based but a probabilistic process that 
incorporates frequency information. 
Wolfe and Van Wert (2010) originally proposed that 
target prevalence in visual search can be modeled with a 
drift diffusion model with a changing starting point. Indeed, 
triplet comparison processes in Figure 4 can be viewed as a 
sequence of drift diffusion models where a consecutive 
model has a higher starting point than the previous one. 
However, Wolfe and Van Wert assumed that the starting 
point can only change between trials and not within trials. 
Our study shows that, in a complex task requiring several 
decisions, the starting point can and should change within a 
trial if there is a high expectation that the target is present. 
During the progression of visual search the estimated 
probability of finding a target should increase. This leads to 
our assumption that prevalence is not only a between-trial 
effect, but also can be observed within a trial in complex 
tasks such as SET. 
ACT-R does not provide a suitable and standardized way 
to model an evidence accumulation process in the 
procedural system. In this study, we proposed that 
production rule's utility can change as a function of 
relevance to a changing context without the production rule 
being executed. It is not inconsistent with the existing utility 
learning mechanism, but adds an additional factor that 
influences utilities. As a proof of concept, the SET model 
used this mechanism to manipulate utility of a single 
production ruule during a trial to replicate a human behavior 
conventionally modeled with accumulation models. While 
we argue for the necessity for such mechanism, more 
studies are required for its implementation that is well 
integrated into ACT-R both theoretically and technically. 
Experimental data and the cognitive model can be 
downloaded from http://www.bcogs.net/models/ 
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